Hart, Oliver
Hart, Oliver D.
Hart, Oliver D., 1948-
Oliver Hart
Hart, Oliver 1948-
Hart, Oliver (Oliver D.)
הארט, אוליבר
VIAF ID: 49326856 (Personal)
Permalink: http://viaf.org/viaf/49326856
Preferred Forms
- 200 _ | ‡a Hart ‡b Oliver
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Hart, Oliver
- 100 1 _ ‡a Hart, Oliver
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Hart, Oliver D
- 100 1 _ ‡a Hart, Oliver D
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Hart, Oliver D.
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Hart, Oliver D. ‡d 1948-
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Hart, Oliver ‡d 1948-
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- 100 0 _ ‡a Oliver Hart
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4xx's: Alternate Name Forms (61)
5xx's: Related Names (11)
- 510 2 _ ‡a American Academy of Arts and Sciences ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Harvard University / Department of Economics
- 510 2 _ ‡a Harvard University ‡b Department of Economics
- 510 2 _ ‡a Harvard University ‡b Department of Economics ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 551 _ _ ‡a London ‡4 ortg ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#placeOfBirth
- 510 2 _ ‡a London School of Economics and Political Science
- 510 2 _ ‡a London School of Economics and Political Science ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a National Academy of Sciences ‡g Washington, DC ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a National Bureau of Economic Research
- 510 2 _ ‡a National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
- 510 2 _ ‡a National Bureau of Economic Research ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
Works
Title | Sources |
---|---|
Agreeing now to agree later : contracts that rule out but do not rule in | |
Allocation, information and markets | |
Banks Are Where The Liquidity Is | |
Capital structure decisions of a public company | |
Cooperatives vs. outside ownership | |
Debt and seniority : an analysis of the role of hard claims in constraining management | |
Debt Enforcement Around the World | |
Default and renegotiation : a dynamic model of debt | |
Different approaches to bankruptcy | |
The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform | |
Exit vs. Voice | |
Firms, contracts, and financial structure | |
Foundations of incomplete contracts | |
Gieop, gyeyak geurigo geumnyung gujo | |
Hold-up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points | |
How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points? | |
Insolvency reform in the UK : a revised proposal | |
Kigyō keiyaku kin'yū kōzō | |
L'entreprise post-RSE : à la recherche de nouveaux équilibres | |
Liquidity and Inefficient Investment | |
More is less : why parties may deliberately write incomplete contracts | |
n84233966 | |
A New Bankruptcy Procedure that Uses Multiple Auctions | |
A new capital regulation for large financial institutions | |
On the design of hierarchies : coordination versus specialization | |
One Share/One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control | |
Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles | |
A proof of the existence of equilibrium without the free disposal assumption | |
The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons | |
Reference points and the theory of the firm | |
Short-term, Long-term, and Continuing Contracts | |
Takeover bids, the free rider problem ... 1979: | |
Takeover bids vs. proxy fights in contests for corporate control | |
Tax Shelters or Efficient Tax Planning? A Theory of The Firm Perspective On the Economic Substance Doctrine | |
A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the Seniority of Claims | |
A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital | |
Unemployment with observable aggregate shocks, 1982: | |
기업, 계약 그리고 금융구조 | |
企业、合同与财务结构 | |
企業契約金融構造 |