Inderst, Roman
Inderst, Roman 1970-
Roman Inderst
VIAF ID: 74799137 ( Personal )
Permalink: http://viaf.org/viaf/74799137
Preferred Forms
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Inderst, Roman
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Inderst, Roman
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Inderst, Roman ‡d 1970-
- 100 0 _ ‡a Roman Inderst
4xx's: Alternate Name Forms (15)
5xx's: Related Names (19)
- 510 2 _ ‡a Centre for Economic Policy Research
- 510 2 _ ‡a Centre for Economic Policy Research ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a European Institute of Business Administration
- 510 2 _ ‡a Freie Universität Berlin ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a INSEAD ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Imperial College of Science and Technology
- 510 2 _ ‡a Imperial College of Science and Technology ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability
- 510 2 _ ‡a Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability ‡g Frankfurt am Main ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a London School of Economics and Political Science
- 510 2 _ ‡a London School of Economics and Political Science ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Università commerciale Luigi Bocconi ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Universität Mannheim ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a University College London ‡b Department of Economics
- 510 2 _ ‡a University College London ‡b Department of Economics ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi
- 510 2 _ ‡a Universität Berlin
- 510 2 _ ‡a Universität Mannheim
Works
Title | Sources |
---|---|
Der Ausbau neuer Netze in der Telekommunikation institutionelle, ökonomische und juristische Betrachtungen | |
Bank capital structure and credit decisions | |
Banking competition and risk-taking when borrowers care about financial prudence | |
Bargaining, mergers, and technology: choice in bilaterally oligopolistic industries | |
Bargaining over Royalties in the Shadow of Litigation | |
Benefits of broad-based option pay | |
Buyer power and supplier incentives | |
Calling circles: network competition with non-uniform calling patterns | |
Cartel Damage Mitigation from Retailers’ Store Brands | |
CEO replacement under private information | |
Competitive insurance markets under adverse selection and capacity constraints | |
Consumer lending when lenders are more sophisticated than households | |
Corporate borrowing and financing constraints | |
A Corporate Finance Perspective on Environmental Policy | |
Countervailing power and dynamic efficiency | |
Decentalized markets with adverse selection, 2000: | |
Delegation of control rights, ownership concentration, and the decline of external finance | |
Distributional conflict in organizations | |
Durable goods with qualtiy [i.e. quality] differentiation | |
Early-stage financing and firm growth in new industries | |
Effekte verschiedener Rabattformen Überlegungen zu einem ökonomisch fundierten Ansatz | |
Financial, literacy and savings account returns, 2014: | |
Financing a portfolio of projects | |
Firm Competition and Cooperation with Norm-Based Preferences for Sustainability | |
How strong buyers spur upstream innovation | |
An "Image Theory" of RPM | |
incentives for takeover in oligopoly | |
Income and Consumption over the Business Cycle : Evidence from Matched Administrative Data | |
Informed lending and security design | |
Innovation, endogenous overinvestment, and incentive pay | |
Internal vs. external financing : an optimal contracting approach | |
Investment under uncertainty and regulation of new access networks | |
"Irresponsible lending" with a better informed lender | |
Keeping the board in the dark: CEO compensation and entrenchment | |
Das kontrafaktische Szenario bei der Berechnung von Kartellschäden | |
A lender-based theory of collateral | |
Loan origination under soft- and hard-information lending | |
Loss Leading as a Threat to Brands | |
Misselling (financial) products: the limits for internal compliance | |
Misselling through agents | |
Nachwirkung von Kartellen | |
Netzzugang, Wettbewerb und Investitionen | |
Nonlinear Incentives and Advisor Bias | |
Die ökonomische Analyse von Nachfragemacht in der Wettbewerbspolitik | |
On contract design with hidden information | |
Only time will tell: a theory of deferred compensation | |
A Practical Review of Methods to Estimate Overcharges using Linear Regression | |
Preise als Qualitätssignal : Implikationen für das Preisbindungsverbot und seine Durchsetzung | |
Preisschirmeffekte | |
Reflective willingness to pay : preferences for sustainable consumption in a consumer welfare analysis | |
Regulating Cancellation Rights with Consumer Experimentation | |
Regulating deferred incentive pay | |
Retail finance: bringing in the supply side | |
Retail mergers: buyer power and product variety | |
Schadensersatz bei Kartellverstößen : Juristische und ökonomische Grundlagen und Methoden | |
Scope and Limitations of Incorporating Externalities in Competition Analysis within a Consumer Welfare Approach | |
Securitization and compensation in financial institutions | |
Selling service plans to differentially informed customers | |
Shopping hours and price competition | |
Socially Optimal Sustainability Standards with Non-Consequentialist ("Warm Glow") Investors | |
Trading on advice | |
Tying under Double-Marginalization | |
Übernahmeanreize im Oligopol | |
Using the statistical concept of "severity" to assess seemingly contradictory statistical evidence (with a particular application to damage estimation) | |
Venture capital contracts and market structure | |
Verhandlungen, Fusionen und Technologiewandel in bilateralen Oligopolen | |
Why peaches must circulate longer than lemons | |
Wie lässt sich der Kundennutzen der Anlageberatung steigern? |