Bester, Helmut, 1953-
Bester, Helmut.
Bester, H.
Helmut Bester
VIAF ID: 5211032 ( Personal )
Permalink: http://viaf.org/viaf/5211032
Preferred Forms
- 200 _ | ‡a Bester ‡b Helmut ‡f 1953-....
- 100 1 _ ‡a Bester, H.
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Bester, Helmut
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Bester, Helmut ‡d 1953-
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- 100 0 _ ‡a Helmut Bester
4xx's: Alternate Name Forms (13)
5xx's: Related Names (11)
- 551 _ _ ‡a Berlin ‡4 ortw ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#placeOfActivity
- 510 2 _ ‡a Centre for Economic Policy Research
- 510 2 _ ‡a Centre for Economic Policy Research ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Diss. Wirtschafts-u. Gesellschaftswiss. Bonn
- 510 2 _ ‡a Freie Universität Berlin ‡b Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Freie Universität Berlin / Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften
- 510 2 _ ‡a Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Universiteit van Tilburg
- 510 2 _ ‡a Universiteit van Tilburg ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Universität Berlin ‡b Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
- 510 2 _ ‡a Universität Bonn
Works
Title | Sources |
---|---|
Anreizfunktion von Kreditverträgen bei unvollständiger Information | |
Bargaining, search costs and equilibrium price distributions | |
Bertrand equilibrium in a differentiated duopoly | |
Conflict resolution under asymmetric information | |
Delay in contests | |
Delegated bargaining and renegotiation | |
Delegation and incentives | |
Easy targets and the timing of conflict | |
Exit options and the allocation of authority | |
Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information | |
Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights | |
Fairness and Competition in a Bilateral Matching Market | |
Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle | |
The incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated industry | |
Informative Reklame | |
Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market | |
"Leichte Beute" und der Zeitpunkt eines Konflikts | |
Loan Sales and Screening Incentives | |
Long-term wage contracts and dual labor markets | |
Moral hazard and equilibrium credit rationing an overview of the issues | |
Non-cooperative bargaining and spatial competition | |
Open market operations and the nonneutrality of money | |
Screening versus rationing in credit markets with imperfect information | |
Sequential competition in Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly | |
Signalling rivalry and quality uncertainty in a duopoly | |
Specific skills, imperfect information and job rationing | |
Strategic pricing, signalling, and costly information acquisition | |
Subjective evaluation versus public information | |
Theorie der Industrieökonomik | |
Über die Allokation von Risiken in unvollständigen Märkten | |
Verzögerung in Konfliktsituationen | |
Wages and productivity growth in a dynamic oligopoly |