Holler, Manfred J., 1946-....
Holler, Manfred J.
Holler, Manfred Joseph, 1946-
Holler, M. J.
Holler, Manfred J. (Manfred Joseph), 1946-
Manfred Holler
Holler, Manfred Joseph
VIAF ID: 2389147967350784200009 ( Personal )
Permalink: http://viaf.org/viaf/2389147967350784200009
Preferred Forms
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Holler, M. J.
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Holler, Manfred J. ‡d 1946-
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Holler, Manfred J., ‡d 1946-....
- 100 1 _ ‡a Holler, Manfred Joseph
- 100 1 _ ‡a Holler, Manfred Joseph ‡d 1946-
- 100 1 0 ‡a Holler, Manfred Joseph, ‡d 1946-
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- 100 0 _ ‡a Manfred Holler
4xx's: Alternate Name Forms (26)
5xx's: Related Names (10)
- 510 2 _ ‡a Disputats, München 1975
- 510 2 _ ‡a Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich ‡b Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Institut für Allokation und Wettbewerb ‡g Hamburg ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Institut für Allokation und Wettbewerb (Hamburg)
- 510 2 _ ‡a Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Zürich)
- 510 2 _ ‡a Institute of SocioEconomics (Hamburg)
- 510 2 _ ‡a Institute of SocioEconomics ‡g Hamburg ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 551 _ _ ‡a München ‡4 ortg ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#placeOfBirth
- 510 2 _ ‡a Universität Hamburg ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Universität Hamburg
Works
Title | Sources |
---|---|
Adam Smith's model of man and some of its consequences | |
Anti-Nash and option for maximin | |
Arbeitsmarktmodelle mit 3 Tabellen | |
Art goes America | |
Classical, modern and new game theory | |
Coalitions and collective action | |
Compatibility effects of set-up costs in the organization of service sytems | |
Consistent choice and sexes : empirical findings and consequences | |
Constrained monotonicity and the measurement of power | |
Democratic decision procedures and stability with reference to the European Union | |
The economics of the good, the bad, and the ugly : secrets, desires, and second mover advantages | |
Efficacy and efficiency of profit-sharing contracts | |
Efficiency and justice revisited | |
Einführung in die Spieltheorie | |
Entscheidung politischer Parteien Modelle zur Bestimmung der Staatstätigkeit | |
Essays in honor of Hannu Nurmi | |
EU Decision Making and the Allocation of Responsibility | |
European governance | |
The evolution of standards / Volker Simmering. - Wiesbaden, 2003. | |
Fair and efficient public pricing : an application to sewage farming | |
Fighting pollution when decisions are strategic | |
Freedom of choice and weighted monotonicity of power | |
Grundkurs Mikroökonomie 50 Aufgaben mit Lösungen | |
Ein halbes Jahrhundert Spieltheorie | |
Homo oeconomicus. | |
How to sell power indices | |
Impartial spectator, moral community and some legal consequences | |
importance of setting the agenda | |
Improving democracy (II) and the NSU | |
Jury on stage a common law play | |
Letter to the Queen | |
The Logic of multiparty systems | |
Machiavelli's possibility hypothesis | |
Measurement of power, probabilities, and alternative models of man | |
Measuring strategic decision behaviour | |
Mikroökonomie, das sozialökonomische Optimum | |
Moral sentiments and self-interest reconsidered | |
Mutual Recognition: Rationale, Logic and Application in the EU Internal Goods Market | |
Niccolò Machiavelli on power | |
Nonprofitable equilibria in reputation games | |
The odyssey of rationality | |
Ökonomische Theorie der Verhandlungen e. Einf. | |
On costs and benefits of voting | |
On interpersonal comparison of value | |
On the compatibility of union workers | |
On the regulation of telecommunications markets | |
On types of responsiveness in the theory of voting | |
Paradox proof decision rules reconsidered | |
political economy of institutional evolution | |
Potential failures of global policies in strategic social choices | |
Power and fairness | |
Power, freedom, and voting essays in honour of Manfred J. Holler | |
Power indices and coalition formation | |
Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After | |
pragmatic interpretation of Ken Binmore's Theory of Justice | |
prince and the law | |
Regulating balance sheet audit a game theoretical analysis | |
Scandal and its theory | |
scandal matrix the use of scandals in the progress of society | |
Scissors and rock : game theory for those who manage | |
Spieltheorie für Manager Handbuch für Strategen | |
Spieltheorie Lite HLM : Aufgaben und Lösungen | |
Strategic markets | |
Strategic social choice and mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person games | |
Strategic standardization in Europe a public choice perspective | |
Strategic unemployment and competition on-the-job | |
Strike ballots in a model with private information | |
Tax compliance policy reconsidered | |
Three characteristic functions and tentative remarks on credible threats | |
Trading markets and entry costs | |
Two stories, one power index | |
Übungsbuch zur Makroökonomik | |
value of a coalition is power | |
Voting on standardization | |
Wahlanalyse : Hypothesen, Methoden und Ergebnisse | |
Wallenstein's power problem and its consequences | |
Why capital hires labour, and why labour does not hire capital | |
Why power indices for assessing EU decision making? | |
Why the Latin American countries do not form a debtors' cartel | |
The ¤Kreps-Wilson monopoly-entrant game and cautiously rationalizable sequential equilibria | |
The ¤pragmatical impossibility of fair bargaining solutions |