Bebchuk, Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Lucian A., 1955-
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye 1957-....
Lucian Bebchuk Finance law scholar
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye
VIAF ID: 77238998 (Personal)
ISNI: 0000 0001 2028 9153
- 200 _ | ‡a Bebchuk ‡b Lucian Arye ‡f 1957-....
- 100 1 _ ‡a Bebchuk, Lucian
- 100 1 0 ‡a Bebchuk, Lucian A.
- 100 1 _ ‡a Bebchuk, Lucian A.
- 100 1 _ ‡a Bebchuk, Lucian A.
- 100 1 _ ‡a Bebchuk, Lucian A. ‡d 1955-
- 100 1 _ ‡a Bebchuk, Lucian Arye
- 100 0 _ ‡a Lucian Bebchuk ‡c Finance law scholar
4xx's: Alternate Name Forms (20)
- 400 1 _ ‡a Bebchuk, Lucian
- 400 1 _ ‡a Bebchuk, Lucian Arye
- 400 1 0 ‡a Bebchuk, Lucian Arye
- 400 1 _ ‡a Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, ‡d 1955-
- 400 1 _ ‡a Bebchuk, Lucian Arye.
- 400 1 _ ‡a Bebchuk, Lucian Arye ‡d 1955-
- 400 1 _ ‡a Bebchuk, Lucian.
- 400 1 _ ‡a Bebchuk, Lucian ‡d 1955-
- 400 1 _ ‡a Bebchuk, Lucien A. ‡d 1955-
- 400 1 _ ‡a Bebchuk, Lucien ‡d 1955-
- 400 _ | ‡a Bebṣ'wq ‡b Lwṣyaʾn ʾAryeh ‡f 1957-....
- 400 _ | ‡a Bebṣ'wq ‡b ʾAryeh Lwṣyaʾn ‡f 1957-....
- 400 _ | ‡a Bebṣ'wq ‡b לוציאן אריה ‡f 1957-....
- 400 1 _ ‡a Bebṣ'wq, Lwṣyaʾn ʾAryeh ‡d 1957-...
- 400 1 _ ‡a Bebṣ'wq, ʾAryeh Lwṣyaʾn ‡d 1957-...
- 400 1 _ ‡a Bebṣ'wq, לוציאן אריה ‡d 1957-...
- 400 0 _ ‡a Lucian Bebchuk ‡c Amerikaans econoom
- 400 0 _ ‡a אריה בבצ'וק
- 400 1 _ ‡a בבצ'וק, אריה לוציאן ‡d 1957-...
- 400 _ | ‡a בבצ'וק ‡b אריה לוציאן ‡f 1957-....
5xx's: Related Names (8)
- 510 2 _ ‡a Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
- 510 2 _ ‡a Harvard University
- 510 2 _ ‡a Harvard University / Harvard School of Law / John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business
- 510 2 _ ‡a John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business
- 510 2 _ ‡a National Bureau of Economic Research
- 510 2 _ ‡a National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
- 510 2 _ ‡a National Bureau of Economic Research ‡e Affiliation
- 551 _ _ ‡a Warschau
|An analysis of fee-shifting based on the margin of victory : on frivolous suits, meritorious suits, and the role of rule 11|
|Bundling and entrenchment|
|The Business roundtable's untenable case against shareholder access|
|The case against board veto in corporate takeovers|
|The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot|
|The CEO pay slice|
|Consent and exchange|
|Corporate law and economic analysis|
|Corporate ownership structures : private versus social optimality|
|Corporate political speech who decides?|
|The costs of entrenched boards|
|Does the evidence favor state competition in corporate law?|
|An economic analysis of transnational bankruptcies|
|The effect of offer-of-settlement rules on the terms of settlement|
|The elusive quest for global governance standards|
|Ex ante costs of violating absolute priority in bankruptcy|
|Executive compensation as an agency problem|
|Executive compensation in America : optimal contracting or extraction of rents?|
|Federal intervention to enhance shareholder choice|
|Federalism and takeover law : the race to protect managers from takeovers|
|Firm expansion and ceo pay|
|Firms' decisions where to incorporate|
|The growth of executive pay|
|Gyoseki rendogata hoshu no kyojitsu : Amerika no yakuin hoshu to koporeto gabanansu.|
|The Harvard Law School proxy access roundtable|
|How to fix bankers' pay|
|How to make TARP II work|
|Information and the scope of liability for breach of contract : the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale|
|Investor protection and interest group politics|
|The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure|
|Learning and the disappearing association between governance and returns|
|The "lemons effect" in corporate freeze-outs|
|Liability for accidents|
|Litigation and settlement under imperfect information, 1983|
|Managerial value diversion and shareholder wealth|
|The Myth of the shareholder franchise|
|Negative expected value suits|
|A new approach to takeover law and regulatory competition|
|One-sided contracts in competitive consumer markets|
|Optimal defaults for corporate law evolution|
|Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals|
|The overlooked corporate finance problems of a Microsoft breakup|
|Pay without performance / Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried. Cambridge, Mass. ; London, 2006.|
|Pay without performance : the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation|
|Paying for long term performance|
|The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boards: theory, evidence and policy|
|Private ordering and the proxy access debate|
|Reconsidering contractual liability and the incentive to reveal information|
|Regulating bankers' pay|
|A rent-protection theory of corporate ownership and control|
|Self-fulfilling credit market freezes|
|Specific performance versus damages for breach of contract|
|Staggered boards and the wealth of shareholders evidence from two natural experiments|
|The state of corporate governance research|
|Stealth compensation via retirement benefits|
|Stock pyramids, cross-ownership, and dual class equity : the creation and agency costs of separating control from cash flow rights|
|Takeover bids below the expected value of minority shares|
|Takeover bids vs. proxy fights in contests for corporate control|
|The uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy : further thoughts and a reply to critics|
|Using options to divide value in corporate bankruptcy|
|Why firms adopt antitakeover arrangements|
|業績連動型報酬の虚実 : アメリカの役員報酬とコーポレート・ガバナンス|
Countries and Regions of Publication (3)
Selected Publishers (10)
- US - United States
- IL - Israel
- eng - English