Ehlers, Lars
Ehlers, Lars H. 1971-
Ehlers, L. (Lars Hermann), 1971-
Lars H. Ehlers
VIAF ID: 727149108532268780003 ( Personal )
Permalink: http://viaf.org/viaf/727149108532268780003
Preferred Forms
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Ehlers, Lars
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Ehlers, Lars H. ‡d 1971-
- 100 1 _ ‡a Ehlers, Lars H. ‡d 1971-
- 100 0 _ ‡a Lars H. Ehlers
4xx's: Alternate Name Forms (7)
5xx's: Related Names (10)
- 510 2 _ ‡a Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative (CIREQ)
- 510 2 _ ‡a Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative
- 510 2 _ ‡a Kwantitatieve Economie
- 510 2 _ ‡a Proefschrift Universiteit Maastricht
- 510 2 _ ‡a Université de Montréal
- 510 2 _ ‡a Université de Montréal ‡b Département de sciences économiques ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Université de Montréal / Département de Sciences Économiques
- 510 2 _ ‡a Université de Montréal. Centre de recherche et développement en économique
- 510 2 _ ‡a Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques
- 510 2 _ ‡a Université de Montréal ‡b Département de Sciences Economiques
Works
Title | Sources |
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An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities | |
Allocation via deferred-acceptance under responsive priorities | |
Alternative organisationsformer i sygevæsenet | |
Arrow's theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences | |
Arrow's theorem in spatial environments | |
Assigning refugees to landlords in Sweden : stable maximum matchings | |
Ein Beitrag zur Zusammenhangsanalyse in wachsenden Datenbeständen | |
Blocking pairs versus blocking students : stability comparisons in school choice | |
Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability | |
Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice | |
Choosing wisely : the natural multi-bidding mechanism | |
Consistent house allocation | |
Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal voting mechanisms | |
Dynamic refugee matching | |
Efficient priority rules | |
Externalities and the nucleolus | |
Externalities, potential, value and consistency | |
Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule | |
Gale's fixed tax for exchanging houses | |
Hornhindebanken Århus Kommunehospital | |
In search of advice for physicians in entry-level medical markets | |
Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options | |
(Il)legal assignments in school choice | |
Manipulation via capacities revisited | |
Matching markets under (in)complete information | |
(Minimally) e-incentive compatible competitive equilibria in economies with indivisibilities | |
Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems | |
Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences : replacement principle | |
Økonomiske konsekvenser ved indførelse af trombolysebehandling i Danmark | |
On fixed-path rationing methods | |
Organizing time banks : lessons from matching markets | |
Population-monotonicity and the replacement-principle for probabilistic decision rules | |
Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules | |
Probabilistic collective decision schemes | |
Regulation via the polluter-pays principle | |
Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems | |
Respecting priorities when assigning students to schools | |
Retail information systems based on SAP products, 2001: | |
Robust design in monotonic matching markets : a case for firm-proposing deferred-acceptance | |
Robust minimal instability of the top trading cycles mechanism | |
School choice with control | |
Screening af gravide indvandrere for hæmoglobinopati | |
Sharing a river among satiable countries | |
Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued | |
Strategy-proof and envy-free random assignment | |
Strategy-proof tie-breaking | |
Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited | |
Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems | |
Top-cycle rationalizability | |
Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods | |
Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants : a mechanism design approach | |
Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems |