Schmitz, Patrick W.
Patrick W. Schmitz
Schmitz, Patrick
Patrick W. Schmitz économiste allemand
VIAF ID: 67325197 ( Personal )
Permalink: http://viaf.org/viaf/67325197
Preferred Forms
- 100 0 _ ‡a Patrick W. Schmitz
- 100 0 _ ‡a Patrick W. Schmitz ‡c économiste allemand
- 100 1 _ ‡a Schmitz, Patrick
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Schmitz, Patrick W.
4xx's: Alternate Name Forms (13)
5xx's: Related Names (4)
- 510 2 _ ‡a Centre for Economic Policy Research
- 510 2 _ ‡a Centre for Economic Policy Research ‡g London ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Universität Bonn
- 510 2 _ ‡a Universität zu Köln / Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Works
Title | Sources |
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Auctions with anticipated emotions: overbidding, underbidding, and optimal reserve prices | |
Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation? | |
Can contracts solve the hold-up problem? : experimental evidence | |
Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases | |
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments | |
Cooling-off in negotiations - does it work? | |
Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? : An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory | |
Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom | |
Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard | |
Garbled elections | |
Gathering information before signing a contract: experimental evidence | |
The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability | |
Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods | |
Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts | |
Investments as signals of outside pptions | |
Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach | |
On second price auctions and imperfect competition | |
Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances | |
Optimal contracting in agency with verifiable ex post information, 2001: | |
Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information | |
Pollution claim settlements reconsidered : Hidden information and bounded payments | |
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information | |
Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement : An experimental investigation | |
Public procurement in times of crisis : the bundling decision reconsidered | |
Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory : A laboratory experiment | |
Repeated moral hazard, limited liability, and renegotiation | |
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points | |
Should a principal hire one agent or two agents to perform two sequential tasks? | |
Should contractual clauses that forbid renegotiation always be enforced? | |
Task scheduling and moral hazard | |
Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm |