Dur, R.A.J. (Albertus Johannes), 1973-
Dur, Robert A. J. 1973-
Dur, R. A.J.
Dur, Robert A.J
Robert A. J. Dur
VIAF ID: 47668614 ( Personal )
Permalink: http://viaf.org/viaf/47668614
Preferred Forms
- 100 1 _ ‡a Dur, R. A.J.
-
- 100 1 _ ‡a Dur, Robert A. J.
- 100 1 _ ‡a Dur, Robert A. J. ‡d 1973-
-
- 100 0 _ ‡a Robert A. J. Dur
4xx's: Alternate Name Forms (16)
5xx's: Related Names (13)
- 510 2 _ ‡a ALGEMENE ECONOMIE
- 510 2 _ ‡a CESifo
- 510 2 _ ‡a CESifo GmbH
- 510 2 _ ‡a CESifo GmbH ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
- 510 2 _ ‡a Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam / Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen
- 510 2 _ ‡a Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam / Faculteit der Economische Wetenschappen / Capaciteitsgroep Algemene Economie
- 510 2 _ ‡a Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
- 510 2 _ ‡a Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- 510 2 _ ‡a Tinbergen Institute ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Tinbergen Instituut
Works
Title | Sources |
---|---|
The credibility problem in unemployment insurance policy | |
desire for impact presented at CESifo Area Conference on Employment and Social Protection, May 2005 | |
Education and efficient redistribution | |
The effect of fiscal rules on public investment if budget deficits are politically motivated | |
Effects of Prize Spread and Noise in Elimination Tournaments: A Natural Field Experiment | |
Employee recognition and performance: a field experiment | |
Explaining unemployment trends in the Netherlands | |
From public monopsony to competitive market more efficiency but higher prices | |
Gedragseconomie en beleid | |
Gift exchange in the workplace: money or attention? | |
How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy | |
Incentives and the sorting of altruistic agents into street level bureaucracies | |
Incentives and workers' motivation in the public sector | |
Intrinsic motivations of public sector employees : Evidence for Germany | |
Lobbying of firms by voters | |
Managerial talent, motivation, and self-selection into public management | |
National interference in local public good provision | |
On the role of the governmental agreement in breaking political deadlocks | |
Optimal incentive contracts when workers envy their boss | |
Political institutions and economic policy choice | |
Politicians' motivation, political culture, and electoral competition | |
The power of a bad example a field experiment in household garbage disposal | |
Producing and manipulating information: private information providers versus public information providers | |
Product market competition and trade union structure | |
Public sector employees: risk averse and altruistic? | |
Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace | |
Sequential advocacy | |
Signaling and screening of workers' motivation | |
Social exchange and common agency in organizations | |
Social interaction, co-worker altruism, and incentives | |
Status-seeking in violent subcultures and the double dividend of zero-tolerance | |
Subsidizing enjoyable education | |
A theory of policy reversal | |
Tournament incentives in the field: gender differences in the workplace | |
Verzilverend vergrijzen | |
Wage-setting institutions, unemployment, and the demand for redistribution policy | |
Why do policy makers stick to inefficient decisions | |
Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities? | |
Working for a good cause |