Wolfstetter, Elmar, 1945-....
Wolfstetter, Elmar
Elmar Wolfstetter
VIAF ID: 24686744 ( Personal )
Permalink: http://viaf.org/viaf/24686744
Preferred Forms
- 100 0 _ ‡a Elmar Wolfstetter
- 200 _ | ‡a Wolfstetter ‡b Elmar ‡f 1945-....
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Wolfstetter, Elmar
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Wolfstetter, Elmar ‡d 1945-
- 100 1 _ ‡a Wolfstetter, Elmar ‡d 1945-
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- 100 1 0 ‡a Wolfstetter, Elmar, ‡d 1945-
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Wolfstetter, Elmar, ‡d 1945-....
4xx's: Alternate Name Forms (14)
5xx's: Related Names (4)
- 551 _ _ ‡a Berlin ‡4 ortw ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#placeOfActivity
- 510 2 _ ‡a Freie Universität Berlin ‡b Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Go lyeo dae hag gyo ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin ‡b Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
Works
Title | Sources |
---|---|
Auctions and corruption | |
Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas | |
Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may serve as a signal | |
Auktionen und Ausschreibungen Bedeutung und Grenzen des "Linkage"-Prinzips | |
Bid shading and risk aversion in multi-unit auctions with many bidders | |
Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions an experimental study | |
Efficient (re-)scheduling : an auction approach | |
Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctions | |
Implementing Efficient Market Structure | |
labor managed firm a duality approach | |
Lohnindexierung und Geldpolitik bei informativen Preisen | |
Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions the GSM spectrum auction in Germany | |
Die Marxsche Theorie und ihre Kritik : eine Textsammlung zur Kritik der Politischen Økonomie | |
Moral hazard and wage dynamics | |
Optimal risk shifting vs. efficient employment in Illyria the labor managed firm under asymetric information | |
Optimal unemployment insurance systems and experience rating | |
Optimal wage indexation and informational externalities when the price level is an imperfect signal | |
Optimale Arbeitsverträge bei asymmetrischer Information ein Beitrag zur Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit ; Vortrag vor dem Theoretischen Ausschuss des Vereins für Socialpolitik auf der Tagung in Davos, 25. - 29. Feb. 1984 | |
Pareto-verbessernde Beschäftigungspolitik bei Risiko-Externalitäten und unvollständigen Märkten | |
Pareto-verbessernde Fiskalpolitik im allgemeinen Gleichgewicht bei rationalen Erwartungen | |
Partnership dissolution, complementarity, and investment incentives | |
Potential competition in natural monopoly efficiency or market breakdown? | |
Potential competition is unfavorable in the classical Bertrand model | |
Private information, wage price indexation and the non neutrality of money a case for welfare improving taxes | |
Reliable weights and measures the enforcer's dilemma | |
Scale Economies and the Dynamics of Recurring Auctions | |
sealed bid auction that matches the English auction | |
Security bid auctions for agency contracts | |
Stochastic dominance theory and applications | |
Surplus labour, synchronized labour costs and Marx's theory of value | |
The Swiss UMTS spectrum auction flop bad luck or bad design? | |
Takeover games without dilution | |
Topics in microeconomics : industrial organization, auctions, and incentives | |
Tripartitel income employment contracts and coalition incentive compatibility | |
Underemployment and optimal contracts a comment | |
Unions and strikes with asymmetric information a comment | |
Unobservable effort, limited liability and the irrelevance of property rights | |
Unsichere Rente wie reagieren Arbeitsangebot und Ersparnis? | |
Wage component behavior in Japanese manufacturing industries a comment on Fitzroy and Hart | |
Wage indexation a noncooperative approach | |
Wage indexation two extensions | |
Wert, Profitrate und Beschäftigung Aspekte d. Marxschen u.d. klass. Wirtschaftstheorie | |
Zu viele Professoren? |