Walzl, Markus
Walzl, Markus 1974-
Markus Walzl
VIAF ID: 23207556 (Personal)
Permalink: http://viaf.org/viaf/23207556
Preferred Forms
- 100 0 _ ‡a Markus Walzl
-
-
- 100 1 _ ‡a Walzl, Markus
-
- 100 1 _ ‡a Walzl, Markus ‡d 1974-
- 100 1 _ ‡a Walzl, Markus ‡d 1974-
4xx's: Alternate Name Forms (4)
5xx's: Related Names (9)
- 510 2 _ ‡a Aachen, Techn. Hochsch
- 510 2 _ ‡a Algemene Economie 1
- 510 2 _ ‡a Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie, Wirtschaftspolitik und Wirtschaftsgeschichte ‡g Innsbruck ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 551 _ _ ‡a Königswinter ‡4 ortg ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#placeOfBirth
- 510 2 _ ‡a Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organizations
- 510 2 _ ‡a Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organizations ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Maastricht University / School of Business and Economics / Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)
- 510 2 _ ‡a Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Universität Bamberg
Works
Title | Sources |
---|---|
An analysis of corporate leniency programs and lessons to learn for EU and US policies | |
Dynamic recontracting processes with multiple indivisible goods | |
The evolution of roommate networks: a comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) | |
How ego-threats facilitate contracts based on subjective evaluations | |
On the evolution of trading institutions: the platform design paradox | |
Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game | |
Self-reporting in optimal law enforcement with criminal teams, multiple stages and ex post asymmetric information | |
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts | |
Subjective performance evaluations, self-esteem, and ego-threats in principal-agent relations | |
Truth, trust, and sanctions : on institutional selection in sender-receiver games | |
Unfair contests | |
Why it pays to conceal : on the optimal timing of acquiring verifiable information |