Swank, O.H. (Otto Hendrik)
Swank, O.H.
Swank, Otto H.
Swank, Otto
Otto H. Swank
VIAF ID: 1649098 ( Personal )
Permalink: http://viaf.org/viaf/1649098
Preferred Forms
- 100 0 _ ‡a Otto H. Swank
- 100 1 _ ‡a Swank, O. H.
- 100 1 _ ‡a Swank, O. H.
- 100 1 _ ‡a Swank, O.H.
-
- 100 1 _ ‡a Swank, Otto
- 100 1 _ ‡a Swank, Otto H.
4xx's: Alternate Name Forms (8)
Works
Title | Sources |
---|---|
The advantage of tying one's economist's hand ; the value of information in a monetary policy model | |
Confidence management : on interpersonal comparisons in teams | |
The consequences of endogenizing information for herd behavior | |
Decision making and learning in a globalizing world | |
Delegation or voting | |
Disciplining and screening top executives | |
Do elections lead to informed public decisions? | |
Do policy makers' distributional desires lead to an inflationary bias? | |
The economic consequences of political culture | |
Economic policy, model uncertainty and elections | |
The effect of fiscal rules on public investment if budget deficits are politically motivated | |
Environmental policy choice under uncertainty | |
Estimation of preference weights in a model of monetary policy with multiplicative uncertainty | |
Government spending cycles: ideological or opportunistic? | |
How polarization and political instability affect learning through experimentation | |
In search of the motives behind US fiscal macroeconomic policy | |
Models of voter behaviour : an application to the Netherlands | |
On the composition of committees | |
On the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies | |
On the role of the governmental agreement in breaking political deadlocks | |
The optimal degree of polarization | |
Partisan views on the economy | |
Polarization, information collection and electoral control | |
Policy makers, advisors, and reputation | |
Policy makers, voters, and optimal control : estimation of the preferences behind monetary and fiscal policy in the United States | |
Popularity functions based on the partisan theory | |
Presidential popularity and reputation | |
Producing and manipulating information: private information providers versus public information providers | |
Rational voters, elections and central banks : do representative democracies need non representative institutions? | |
Rational voters in a partisanship model | |
A rationalization of US economic policy making | |
The self-perception theory versus a dynamic learning model | |
Sequential advocacy | |
Sharing information through delegation and collaboration | |
A simple model of self-assessments | |
A theory of policy reversal | |
Towards an economic theory of party ideology | |
Transparency and pre-meetings | |
Vanity in politics: a problem? | |
Vooruitzichten voor de metaalverwerkende industrie | |
Wage rigidity in the United States : the role of price expectations | |
When Galatea cares about her reputation : how having faith in your workers reduces their motivation to shine | |
Why are residents reluctant to consult attending physicians? | |
Why do administrations postpone policy on which there is overall agreement |