Roth, Alvin E., 1951-....
Alvin Eliot Roth professor
Roth, Alvin E.
רות, אלווין, 1951-
Roth, Alvin Eliot
VIAF ID: 109190323 ( Personal )
Permalink: http://viaf.org/viaf/109190323
Preferred Forms
- 100 0 _ ‡a Alvin Eliot Roth ‡c professor
- 100 0 _ ‡a Alvin Eliot Roth ‡c professor
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Roth, Alvin E.
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Roth, Alvin E. ‡d 1951-
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Roth, Alvin E. ‡d 1951-
- 100 1 _ ‡a Roth, Alvin E. ‡d 1951-
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Roth, Alvin E., ‡d 1951-
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Roth, Alvin E., ‡d 1951-
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- 100 1 _ ‡a Roth, Alvin E., ‡d 1951-....
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4xx's: Alternate Name Forms (59)
5xx's: Related Names (16)
- 510 2 _ ‡a Dept. of Operations Research, Stanford University
- 510 2 _ ‡a Graduate School of Business (Pittsburgh, Pa.)
- 510 2 _ ‡a Graduate School of Business ‡g Pittsburgh, Pa. ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration
- 510 2 _ ‡a Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Harvard University / Department of Economics
- 510 2 _ ‡a Harvard University / Harvard Business School / Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit
- 510 2 _ ‡a Harvard University ‡b Department of Economics
- 510 2 _ ‡a Harvard University ‡b Department of Economics ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a National Bureau of Economic Research
- 510 2 _ ‡a National Bureau of Economic Research ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Stanford University ‡b Department of Economics
- 510 2 _ ‡a Stanford University ‡b Department of Economics ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a University of Illinois
- 510 2 _ ‡a University of Illinois ‡4 affi ‡4 https://d-nb.info/standards/elementset/gnd#affiliation ‡e Affiliation
- 510 2 _ ‡a Université de Montréal. Département de sciences économiques
Works
Title | Sources |
---|---|
Axiomatic models of bargaining | |
The collapse of a medical labor clearinghouse (and why such failures are rare) | |
Como funcionam os mercados : a nova economia das combinações e do desenho de mercado | |
Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions | |
The effects of a centralized clearinghouse on job placement, wages, and hiring practices | |
Efficient kidney exchange: coincidence of wants in a structured market | |
An experimental analysis of ending rules in internet auctions | |
Fu gettsu howatto : Macchimeikingu to maketto dezain no keizaigaku. | |
The handbook of experimental economics, 1995; | |
Handbook of market design | |
In 100 years leading economists predict the future | |
Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange | |
Kdo dostává co a proč: nové ekonomické směry v konceptu vhodného párování matchmaking a návrzích podoby trhů market design | |
Kto co dostaje i dlaczego : matchmaking : ekonomia kojarzenia stron transakcji i projektowania rynku | |
Laboratory experimentation in economics : six points of view | |
Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions : evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the internet | |
Maeching | |
Les marchés où l'argent ne fait pas la loi : des conceptions innovantes pour des appariements efficaces | |
Market culture: how norms governing exploding offers affect market performance | |
Marketplace institutions related to the timing of transactions | |
Matching with Couples : Stability and Incentives in Large Markets | |
n79103247 | |
Organ Allocation Policy and the Decision to Donate | |
Pairwise kidney exchange | |
The redesign of the matching market for American physicians : some engineering aspects of economic design | |
Repugnance as a constraint on markets | |
Risk aversion in bargaining : an experimental study | |
The Shapley value : essays in honor of Lloyd S. Shapley | |
Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: redesigning the New York City High School match | |
Sztuka projektowania rynków | |
timing of bids in Internet auctions market design, bidder behavior and artificial agents | |
Two-sided matching : a study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis | |
Unraveling reduces the scope of an entry level labor market : gastroenterology with and without a centralized match | |
Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply: an experimental investigation | |
Values for games without sidepayments : some difficulties with current concepts | |
Wer kriegt was - und warum? Bildung, Jobs und Partnerwahl : wie Märkte funktionieren | |
What have we learned from market design? | |
Who gets what - and why | |
Who gets what--and why : the new economics of matchmaking and market design | |
Wie krijgt wat - en waarom : de nieuwe economie van koppelen en marktontwerpen | |
매칭 | |
매칭 숨은 시장을 발굴하는 강력한 힘 | |
새로운 부의 시대 21-22세기 미래 예측 보고서 | |
フー・ゲッツ・ホワット : マッチメイキングとマーケットデザインの新しい経済学 |